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Ethics, universality and vulnerability in Abderrahmane 






This article adds philosopher Judith Butler to the list of thinkers whose work 
underpins the interest in ethics and/in film that began in earnest in the 2000s. 
Beginning with Precarious Life: Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004), 
Butler has published several volumes that blend ethical thinking with moral 
theory and political philosophy, focusing on the concepts of precariousness 
and vulnerability. This article suggests that two films directed by 
Abderrahmane Sissako, Bamako (2006) and Timbuktu (2014), as dramas of 
precariousness and vulnerability respectively, can inform thinking about 
cinematic ethics: the staging of a trial of global institutions in Bamako 
dramatizes the possible universalization of an ethic of precarity, while in 
Timbuktu, the condemnation to death of a Tuareg shepherd by Ansar Dine, 
the militant Islamist group that occupied parts of Mali in 2012, allows Sissako 





The so-called ‘ethical turn’ in the humanities that gathered pace in the 1990s 
began to engage productively with film studies during the decade that 
followed. The death of Emmanuel Levinas in 1995 doubtless contributed to 
new directions taken by ethical thinking at around that time, so it is 
appropriate that one of the first books on ethics and/in film was Sarah 
Cooper’s study Selfless Cinema? Ethics and French Documentary,1 rapidly 
followed up by ‘The Occluded Relation. Levinas and Cinema’,2 an issue of the 
online journal Film-Philosophy Cooper produced out of a conference 
organized at London’s Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies. A number 
of books about film and ethics followed that have engaged the thinking of a 
wide range of philosophers: Jane Stadler’s Pulling Focus,3 which draws 
particularly on the work of Martha Nussbaum and Vivian Sobchack; Lisa 
Downing and Libby Saxton’s Film and Ethics: Foreclosed Encounters,4 which 
treats the work of Lacan, Žižek, Badiou and Foucault as well as Levinas and 
Derrida; Jinhee Choi and Mattias Frey’s wide-ranging edited volume Cine-
Ethics: Ethical Dimensions of Film Theory, Practice and Spectatorship,5 and 
Robert Sinnerbrink’s Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through 
Film.6 Levinas, of course, was not himself a philosopher of film, and Foucault 
and Lacan only qualify for this status to a limited degree, so it is perhaps not 
surprising that the growing literature on film and ethics – Sinnerbrink’s 
Cinematic Ethics is a prime example – tends to privilege two philosophers 
who have actually devoted volumes to film and cinema, Stanley Cavell and 
Gilles Deleuze. Absent from any of these books is consideration of the work in 
ethics of one of the most influential philosophers of the last twenty-five years, 
Judith Butler, whose feminist philosophy and theory of the 1990s transformed 
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gender studies and played a major part in the establishment and growth of 
queer theory. Butler’s gender-related publications up to and including Undoing 
Gender (2004) may indeed not be relevant to consideration of the ethical turn 
and its integration into film-philosophy and film studies, but starting with her 
book Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence,7 a set of five 
essays written after the New York terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 ‘and 
in response to the conditions of heightened vulnerability and aggression that 
followed from those events’,8 she has published a series of books that blend 
ethical thinking with political theory and moral philosophy, Giving an account 
of oneself (2005), Frames of war: when is life grievable? (2009), Parting ways: 
Jewishness and the critique of Zionism (2012), and Senses of the subject 
(2015).9 An engagement with film and visual media is promised by Butler in 
the preface to Precarious Life when she says of Levinas, ‘Through a cultural 
transposition of his philosophy, it is possible to see how dominant forms of 
representation can and must be disrupted for something about the 
precariousness of life to be apprehended’.10 This article will not engage in a 
critique of the mainstreaming of representations of violence, or dwell on the 
turn to Levinasian ethics Butler made in Precarious Life and developed in her 
own terms in Frames of War: it will, rather, consider how the ethics Butler 
formulated out of Levinas’s de-centred humanism in her writings of the 2000s 
can inform and be informed by Abderrahmane Sissako’s screening of the 
injustices faced by the populations of developing countries in Bamako (2006) 
and Timbuktu (2014).   
 
Butler’s ethics of precariousness and vulnerability 
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The concepts Butler develops most fully in her ethical writings are 
precariousness and vulnerability. Precariousness is a term Levinas uses 
explicitly in the essay ‘Peace and Proximity’, in one of his commentaries on 
how the face – his figure for the ethical demand made on me by the other – ‘is 
not exclusively a human face’: it can be figured by other parts of the human 
body and is also said to consist of the sounds of suffering and agony, to 
constitute ‘an utterance that is not, strictly speaking, linguistic’.11 In Butler’s 
description, it is ‘a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense, 
the sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes and limits the delivery 
of any semantic sense’.12 She continues 
 
At the end of this description, Levinas appends the following lines, 
which do not quite accomplish the sentence form: “The face as the 
extreme precariousness of the other. Peace as awakeness to the 
precariousness of the other” (PP 167). Both statements are similes, 
and they both avoid the verb, especially the copula. They do not say 
that the face is that precariousness, or that peace is the mode of being 
awake to an Other’s precariousness. Both phrases are substitutions 
that refuse any commitment to the order of being. Levinas tells us, in 
fact, that “humanity is a rupture of being”.13 
 
Butler draws attention here to how Levinas’s remarks about the face perform 
the suspension and rupture of the order of being that the concept describes. 
She then sums up her interpretation of Levinas by writing ‘To respond to the 
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face, to understand its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in 
another life, or, rather, the precariousness of life itself’.14 On the words ‘or, 
rather’ in this sentence hangs the move to universalizing precarity that Butler 
makes in her 2009 set of essays Frames of War. When is Life Grievable?, 
whose final essay ‘The Claim of Non-Violence’ returns particularly to Levinas 
and the objective of “[thinking] through what an ethic of Jewish non-violence 
might be”,15 that she began in ‘Precarious Life’. One of the issues Butler is 
interested in in Frames of War, therefore, is what might be called a post-
secular ethics (an ethic of Jewish non-violence or a Jewish ethic of non-
violence), but she does also discuss the generalization of an ethic of non-
violence beyond the conflict in the Middle East that is her particular focus. The 
lives of the Africans Sissako films in Bamako and Timbuktu are every bit as 
questionably grievable as the victims of the wars in Iraq and the Middle East 
Butler has mainly been concerned with in her recent writings, and it is this 
shared status of questionable ‘validity’ – who ‘counts’ as human and grievable 
in wars and regional conflicts, and who does not? – that makes her 
conceptualization of precariousness and vulnerability a suitable approach to 
Sissako’s film dramas. Sissako foregrounds this connectedness to non-
fictional hardships in Bamako and makes no attempt to disguise it in 
Timbuktu. 
    It is what she sees as Butler’s vacillation and contradictoriness on the 
possible universalization of an ethic of precarity that Mari Ruti targets for 
critique in her recent book Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, other, ethics 
(2015). Bamako’s mise en scène of the legal clash between global institutions 
and Malians’ experience of the damage done to their country by these 
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institutions’ policies can inform both how Butler wrestles with the issue of 
universalism and the way she is taken to task by Ruti for so doing, and this is 
why I am drawing on the film’s unlikely juxtaposition of the global and the local 
in order to explore Butler’s engagement with a universalized ethic alongside 
Ruti’s critique of how Butler does this. 
 
Universality, ethics and aesthetics in Bamako 
 
The drama of Bamako – a juxtaposition of everyday life in the capital city of 
Mali, Sissako’s country of upbringing, with a trial of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund as global institutions by spokespersons for 
African civil society – might be said to pose questions about how film 
functions as what Robert Sinnerbrink terms ‘a medium of ethical experience’. 
Its distinctive manner of doing this is to interweave the universal and the 
local/singular in both its dramatic form and its aesthetic, a feature that 
corresponds to the fourth dimension of the cinema-ethics relationship set out 
by Sinnerbrink in the first chapter of his Cinematic Ethics (the first three are 
‘ethical content in narrative cinema; the ethics of cinematic representation 
(from filmmaker and spectator perspectives); and the ethics of cinema as 
symptomatic of broader cultural, social and ideological concerns’ (p.16)). 
Sinnerbrink’s fourth dimension is referred to for brevity as just ‘the aesthetic 
dimension of cinema’, but glossed as ‘the role of aesthetic form in intensifying 
our experience, refining and focusing our attention, and thus of conveying 
complexity of meaning through manifold means – [as] a way of evoking ethical 
experience and thereby inviting further ethical-critical reflection’ (p.16)) 
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    The main way in which the viewer of Bamako experiences this interweaving 
of the universal and the singular is the situating of the trial already mentioned, 
in a courtyard that is both a domestic and a public space. (In French, cour 
means both ‘courtyard’ and ‘court’ in the judiciary sense, a double meaning of 
which the film takes full advantage.) Huge pieces of vividly patterned newly 
dyed cloth are hung out to dry all around this cour and makeshift court, and 
are regularly used by Sissako as a backdrop against which to film inhabitants 
of the courtyard and members of the trial’s audience as they move around or 
watch and listen to lawyers and witnesses speak.16 By means of this carefully 
crafted mise en scene, Sissako ensures that the domestic and the public (the 
singular and the universal) overlap with one another constantly, and become 
inextricable. The dramatic improbability of such a trial of global institutions 
taking place first, at all, and secondly, at the heart of a community and a 
country decimated by the policies of those institutions is not just an initial 
shock in Bamako: it is regularly re-iterated by aesthetic contrasts and clashes 
of various kinds. Young children unaware of what is going on wander through 
the space between the trial’s audience, seated in serried ranks, and the 
judges’ table, which is positioned at the same level as the audience rather 
than above it as in a courtroom. Each time one of them does so, improbability 
and incongruency are emphasized.17 Sissako’s camera regularly quits the trial 
proceedings to show the cloth dyers at work or action underway elsewhere in 
the courtyard, in the homes that open onto it, or outside the entry gate, where 
a group of local men sit listening to the proceedings relayed through a 
loudspeaker they often switch off in displeasure at or weariness with what 
they hear. As Saxton summarizes, ‘Through Sissako’s creative use of space 
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and depth of field, the boundaries between the trial and quotidian reality are 
literally blurred, demystifying, domesticating and democratizing the legal 
process’.18 In this way unmotivated parallel editing or cross-cutting seems to 
become Sissako’s preferred cinematic device, one which keeps the many 
elements of the film’s drama disparate rather than linking them up. As Alison 
J. Levine observes in an article about Bamako’s use of traditionally African 
modes of oral performance, the film entirely lacks narrative tension,19 
preferring circularity to linearity (we see singer Mélé perform twice, at the start 
and end of the film just before her husband Chaka’s suicide). And the 
disparate, fragmented character of the film’s action is matched at the level of 
the frame, which is (as already mentioned) often partly blocked out by the 
sheets of brightly coloured cloth hung out to dry by the cloth-dyers. The 
reading of Bamako by Akin Adesoken in ‘Abderrahmane Sissako and the 
politics of engaged expatriation’ argues that the form of the film follows from 
the sources of funding available to Sissako as an expatriate director based 
mainly in Paris,20 but whether this is accurate or not, Bamako’s visual and 
verbal texture seems to me to be so plural and yet so tightly woven as to merit 
a description as an aesthetic of disparity or of interruption, one by which the 
viewer’s attention and engagement are continually displaced and re-referred 
between the global issues in which the trial deals and the pressing local 
difficulties of everyday life in Mali’s capital city. 
    Three of the principal characters to feature in Bamako are Chaka, his 
beautiful singer wife Mélé, and their daughter, toddler Ina, a family whose 
home opens onto the courtyard where the trial is taking place. Chaka and 
Mélé ‘s marriage has deteriorated to the point where they hardly speak: we 
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see Chaka requesting information about his wife from one of her friends rather 
than asking her directly, and Mélé telling her mother on the phone that she is 
planning to return to live with her in Dakar, leaving Ina to be cared for by her 
husband. The judges, lawyers, witnesses at and audience to the trial 
constitute the rest of the film’s large cast of characters, only some of whom 
are named, such as Samba Diakité, whose witness statement consists of 
almost a minute’s complete silence, and Zegué Bamba, the one witness 
filmed arriving at court at the start of the film, who is refused permission to 
deliver his statement when he first comes up to the stand, and told instead to 
wait his turn. When he is finally allowed to take the stand, he sings his 
statement in the Senoufo language rather than speaking it in French, 
unsubtitled by Sissako, who explains in interview that he chose to do this 
because the statement’s effect on the trial’s audience and film’s viewers 
resides in its musical delivery – a lament – rather than in its verbal content.  
(This seems to dramatize exactly what Butler says in Precarious Life about 
the Levinassian face consisting of the sounds of suffering and agony, 
constituting ‘an utterance that is not, strictly speaking, linguistic’, and being 
audible in ‘the sound of language evacuating its sense, the sonorous 
substratum of vocalization that precedes and limits the delivery of any 
semantic sense’.) Bamako’s main judges and lawyers are played by real-life 
magistrates, and there is a cameraman filming the trial, although we do not 
see any proceedings from his point of view until they are over except for the 
verdict, which is never heard because the film ends instead with the suicide of 
Chaka. The washed-out video footage of a procession of mourners we see in 
the final minutes of the film contrasts strikingly with the rich colours of the rest 
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of it, which is as colourful as it is because of the ochre shade of the 
courtyard’s walls, the fabrics of the locals’ clothing, and the cloth-dyeing that 
is going on all around the court’s proceedings.  
    The argument running through Ruti’s Between Levinas and Lacan attempts 
to rethink the post-enlightenment ethical subject by pitting Levinas and Butler 
on the one hand against Lacan, Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou on the other. In 
seemingly Habermasian mode, Ruti wishes to re-balance what she considers 
the excessive swing to non- and anti-normative paradigms brought about by 
posthumanist theory, and argues accordingly for ‘the possibility of a priori 
norms that are binding without being metaphysically grounded,21 a possibility 
generally refuted by the posthumanist thinkers on which her book 
concentrates. Her critique of Butler, accordingly, picks out a number of 
moments in Frames of War and Parting Ways when Butler suddenly seems to 
re-invoke the normative ethical models of the Enlightenment without 
explaining how these may be accommodated by her non-normative and anti-
Enlightenment thinking. Butler’s claim ‘that Palestinians have the right to have 
basic rights, such as the right not to be dispossessed of land, due to their 
membership in a global human community’22 is probably the best example of 
one of these ethically normative moments. The subtitle of Ruti’s chapter 
critiquing Butler is ‘Judith Butler’s reluctant universalism’, and takes as its 
epigraph the ‘new bodily ontology’ Butler declares at the start of Frames of 
War will be necessary if future ethical theorizing is to be approached on more 
than a case-by-case basis: this new bodily ontology, she specifies, ‘implies 
the rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, 
exposure, bodily persistence, desire, work and the claims of language and 
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social belonging’.23 Whether a sufficiently flexible such new bodily ontology is 
possible and whether Butler succeeds in formulating it are two questions this 
exploration of two films may not be able to advance very far, but what Ruti 
seems to me to succeed in demonstrating about Butler is that she is not so 
much a ‘reluctant’ as an ambivalent universalist. This might, in my view, be 
exactly the kind required by posthumanist ethical theorizing: surely the so-
called ‘ethical turn’ widely observed in the humanities since the 1990s benefits 
rather than loses if it adopts a qualified kind of universalism in which 
universals are inclusive of singularities rather than subsuming them into 
undifferentiated sameness? (This approach to the relationship between 
universality and ethics implies Derrida and Levinas as philosophical reference 
points rather than Hegel, to whom Butler often pledges adherence in her 
earlier work, and Nietzsche: it suggests that she has moved progressively 
away from an ethics of the (self)same towards an ethics of alterity.)  Bamako 
resembles films such as Michael Haneke’s Caché (2005) in its concentration 
of universal (global) ethical dilemmas into singular situations: Bamako moves 
constantly between a local family’s tragedy and the international issues of the 
trial,24 while in Caché, all the tensions of post-colonial France are 
concentrated into the drama of Georges and Anne Laurent receiving 
threatening video tapes and drawings from an anonymous sender at their 
comfortable Parisian home. Bamako presents its viewers with a much starker 
vision of the effects of injustice and poverty than Caché, of course, and by 
concluding with the suicide of a local man rather than the trial’s verdict, 
implies that singular tragedies of this kind cannot be subsumed into the 
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generalized financial mismanagement or political ineptitude demonstrated by 
the ‘developed’ world towards so-called ‘developing’ countries.  
    A further manner in which Bamako suggestively complicates the 
relationship between universality and singularity is in its photography of native 
Malians who observe rather than participating in its trial of the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. As already mentioned, the cloth-dyers 
working in the courtyard are one source of ambient local activity to which 
Sissako’s camera moves when the witness stand is unoccupied. Cloth-dyeing 
is a craft widely practised in Mali, and associated particularly with its capital 
city: the brocades produced by the dyeing process may not always have been 
woven locally (although the cotton is likely to have been grown in Africa), but 
the expertise of the largely female workforce, who mix and apply their dyes by 
hand, is internationally known and appreciated, and the patterns they produce 
often have symbolic significance only comprehensible to Malians or even just 
inhabitants of Bamako and its environs. So when Sissako films individual 
dyers standing next to their sheets of newly-dyed cloth as they watch the trial, 
these portrait-style shots of a few seconds’ duration are not simply the 
universalizing ‘portrait of a native’ they may appear to be to Bamako’s 
Western viewers: rather, the colour and pattern of the cloth itself particularize 
its producer (for those who know how to ‘read’ the cloth), de-universalizing by 
means of mise en scène. 
 
Violence and vulnerability in Timbuktu 
 
The political turn of events that gave Sissako the opportunity to title the 
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feature film with which he followed Bamako after another of Mali’s major cities 
(Timbuktu) was the control over the northeastern regions of Mali claimed by 
the militant Islamist group Ansar Dine in late March of 2012. Ansar Dine’s 
links to the Al-Quaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been 
both surmised and disputed, but what is certain is that the joint forces of 
Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
had occupied Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal in addition to Aguelhok, Tessalit and 
Tinzaouaten (three towns close to Mali’s border with Algeria) by the first few 
days of April 2012, and that Sharia law held sway in Timbuktu until the city 
was liberated by the French-led military action Operation Serval in January 
2013. Sissako’s main subject in Timbuktu is everyday life under Sharia law, 
and the film does not therefore dwell on the economic mistreatment of Mali by 
Western and global institutions in the same way as Bamako, but it thematizes 
injustice every bit as powerfully and perhaps more so, by showing the 
suffering and death brought to ordinary people by the inflexible cruelty of 
Sharia law. In Timbuktu, precariousness and vulnerability are experienced in 
the face of political violence, the violence of terror, a theme Sissako may have 
chosen in order once more to expose a modern-day global issue, vulnerability 
to a quasi-universal violence.  
    It is an indication of Sissako’s slowly growing international reputation that 
Timbuktu, his fifth feature film, has far outstripped the commercial 
performance of his previous films while also achieving enormous critical 
success: by April 2016 it was ‘the topgrossing African film – by a black African 
director – in US box office history, making over $1m’.25 Released at the end of 
2014 in continental Europe and more widely in Europe and worldwide (Brazil, 
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Turkey, Mexico, Taiwan and Japan) in 2015, Timbuktu won no fewer than 
seven Césars at France’s annual award ceremony in February 2015, for Best 
Film, Best Director, Best Original Writing, Best Editing, Best Sound, Best 
Original Score and Best Cinematography. It was also nominated for the Best 
Foreign Language Film Oscar, the 2015 winner of which was Pawel 
Pawlikowski’s Ida (2013). Making use of the beauty of African landscape in a 
way that the spatially concentrated drama of Bamako rarely allowed, 
Timbuktu is filmed largely in desert locations that resemble those around its 
eponymous city, although continuing political unrest in Mali meant that 
Sissako had to film almost exclusively in his native Mauritania.26 Particularly 
memorable sequences of the film’s landscape photography include those of 
the Tuareg Berbers’ encampment in the sand dunes outside the city, where 
these nomadic shepherds and farmers graze their cattle, feed and milk their 
goats, and live what is on the surface of things an idyllically civilised life in 
their spacious and richly decorated tents. Two striking posters for the film 
featured, respectively, a single green tree amid the seemingly unending 
expanse of golden dunes, and leisured after-hours music-making in the tent of 
the Tuareg family who are its main narrative agents, an unforgettable image 
of the contented and cultured family life that the presence of Ansar Dine is 
about to destroy forever.  
    In the first scene of Timbuktu, we watch a Western prisoner being 
transferred from one desert location to another by his Jihadist captors, one of 
numerous possible narrative threads to which the film never returns, allowing 
them instead to serve as vignettes of the casual and even amateurish brutality 
of Jihadist rule. As Elisabeth Lequeret observes,  
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The city – its stalls, its mosques, its inhabitants quietly attending to 
their business, is still calm, like a semi-healthy organism threatened by 
an incurable virus. The jihadists are everywhere and nowhere. 
Emerging from behind a dune to blindfold a Tuareg shepherd girl. 
Nabbing a small-time fish-seller to make him (sic) put on socks and 
gloves – at 113 degrees in the shade.27 
 
The film’s story becomes riddled with questions, drawing the viewer into the 
same kind of shuttling between sites that characterized Sissako’s 
cinematography in Bamako: ‘What happened to the Western hostage? To the 
young fishmonger? To the children who, in one of the movie’s most beautiful 
scenes, take turns dribbling an imaginary soccer ball? In Timbuktu, ellipses 
and off-camera events constantly destabilize the frame’.28     
    However, the regular shifts of location in Timbuktu limit a progressive 
narrative rather than undermining it altogether as in Bamako: as already 
indicated, the central narrative thread of Timbuktu concerns a Tuareg family 
living in the dunes outside the city, sustained by their livestock and almost 
accidentally drawn into the web of authoritarian actions administered by 
Sissako’s fictional version of Ansar Dine. Shepherd Kidane (Ibrahim Ahmed), 
his wife Satima (Toulou Kiki), their daughter Toya (Layla Mohamed) and their 
twelve year-old shepherd Issan (Mehdi Mohamed) are a tight-knit group of 
Tuareg Berbers scarcely concerned by the regular visits to their compound 
made by the deputy to Timbuktu’s chief Jihadist, Abdelkrim (Abdel Jafri), who 
attempts to woo Satima despite being unable to speak the Tamasheq 
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language and clear indifference on her part. Abdelkrim, who is seen failing to 
master the controls of a 4 x 4 vehicle he is being taught to drive by a much 
younger Jihadist, initially plays no part in the events that embroil Kidane in the 
harsh regime of punishments the Jihadists are meting out, which are triggered 
when one of the family’s small herd of cows amusingly nicknamed ‘GPS’ by 
Kidane and Toya escapes Issan’s control and wanders destructively into the 
carefully erected nets of local fisherman Amadou. Amadou launches a 
sharpened spear into GPS’s neck, and she sinks, groaning, into the shallows 
of the river. When Kidane hears this news from Issan, confrontation is 
inevitable, and he immediately seeks Amadou out by the river: Amadou is 
accidentally shot in the tussle that ensues, and Kidane is almost immediately 
arrested by the Jihadist police – though not before he is seen stumbling back 
across the river towards his home in an unforgettably beautiful extreme long 
shot of the Niger river at sunset in which he is reduced to a tiny matchstick-
sized figure in the landscape. It is significant to how the drama of Timbuktu 
plays out that Sissako films the incident that leads to Kidane’s execution in 
such an achingly glorious setting: the image of the Niger (the main river of 
western Africa, which after leaving Mali runs south through Niger then Nigeria 
to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea) both displays the director’s rootedness in his 
homeland and reminds us of the coincidence of beauty and tragedy in the 
condition of one African nation in the twenty-first century. 
    It is my contention that Timbuktu, like Bamako, dramatizes issues central to 
Butler’s ethics, in this case (as already suggested) the vulnerability also 
emphasized in Levinas’s writings on the face. Butler comments on the 
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vulnerability of the Levinasian subject in her early essay ‘Ethical 
Ambivalence’,29  
 
Indeed, this self is “accused by the Other to the point of 
persecution”…the position of the subject . . . is . . . a substitution by a 
hostage expiating for the violence of the persecution itself. Importantly, 
there is no self prior to the persecution by the Other. It is that 
persecution that establishes the Other at the heart of the self, and 
establishes that “heart” as an ethical relation of responsibility. To claim 
the self-identity of the subject is thus an act of irresponsibility, an effort 
to close off one’s fundamental vulnerability [my emphasis] to the Other, 
the primary accusation that the Other bears.30 
 
This passage is an excellent illustration of how different the Levinasian 
subject Butler brings into her thinking from 2000 onwards is from the 
autonomous and sovereign subject of ontologically grounded philosophies: by 
defining ethics as ‘first philosophy’, Levinas reverses the priority of ontology 
over ethics and reconfigures ethics as a ‘persecution’, an originary 
vulnerability that precedes being. As Moya Lloyd (who declares herself 
particularly interested in the ontological assumptions grounding Butler’s 
ethics) summarizes, ‘In short, this is an ethics, indeed a potentially global 
ethics, which issues out of a common human experience of vulnerability, and 
particularly vulnerability to violence’.31 Exposed internationally as vulnerable 
in this way by the events of 11/9/2001, the US ‘heightened nationalist 
discourse, extended constitutional rights and developed forms of explicit and 
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implicit censorship’,32 when it could and should, in Butler’s view, have taken 
the political opportunity to ‘redefine itself as part of the global community’ 
(ibid.) by acknowledging the human interdependency that is as structuring a 
force in politics as it is in social and personal life. This was an opportunity ‘to 
reflect on the relation between human vulnerability and violence; and to 
consider “what, politically, might be made of grief besides a cry for war” ’33 – 
the post-secular ethic of non-violence Butler adumbrates in ‘Precarious Life’ 
and returns to in Frames of War. Commenting on this condition of vulnerability 
in one of few pieces of writing to relate Butler’s recent work to film (Clint 
Eastwood’s Mystic River (2003), dubbed Eastwood’s ‘cinematic critique of 
revenge’34), Robert Watkins argues that the precariousness of life as 
conceived by Butler constitutes ‘the ontological condition of possibility for 
subjectivity’ through its very ambivalence. This ambivalence is that we as 
human subjects are fundamentally dependent on others for our survival, but 
risk generating cycles of violence through our ‘exposure to violence’ and 
‘vulnerability to loss’35 by engaging in acts of vengeance precisely when we 
should forbear from so doing. ‘In the eyes of Butler and Eastwood, loss 
reveals the condition of common vulnerability and challenges us to keep our 
rage from overwhelming our common humanity’.36 
    Precarious interdependence and the question of how to respond to violence 
is dramatized pointedly in Timbuktu by the stand-off between Kidane and 
Amadou that follows the killing of the family’s favourite cow. Disregarding 
Satima’s advice not to do so, Kidane takes his revolver along, which leads to 
an ambivalent act of vengeance made possible by being armed, despite 
uncertainty over Kidane’s intentions. Kidane is not a violent man, but by semi-
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unwittingly committing a vengeful act when the loss of one of his small herd of 
eight cows (GPS, tellingly, was with calf, an indicator of future prosperity) has 
exposed his condition of common vulnerability with Amadou, he moves 
beyond a re-affirmation of this common humanity into a new cycle of violence 
which, although it will in fact go no further, instantly seals his fate. The 
confrontation and tussle between Kidane and Amadou perfectly dramatizes 
Levinas’s and Butler’s arguments that ethics is sited in this vulnerability to 
violence. Similarly, in the opening sequence of Timbuktu, we see a beautiful 
gazelle racing desperately across sand dunes, pursued by a jeep full of armed 
Jihadists whose aim is not to kill it but to run it to ground: ‘Wear it out’ one of 
them calls to the others, ‘don’t kill it, wear it out’. The final shot of the film 
shows Toya toiling across an identical stretch of desert, just after her parents 
have both been killed by Ansar Dine when they mistake Satima’s arrival on 
the back of a motorbike at Kidane’s execution for a rescue attempt, and shoot 
her as well as her husband. Toya must suspect her father’s fate, but 
presumably does not yet know she is now an orphan. The parallel between 
the delicate, graceful gazelle and Toya is evidently intended by Sissako as an 
image of vulnerability: if Toya is not yet being hunted down and taunted by 
Jihadist violence, she is now exposed to it in just the same way that her father 
has been, a vulnerable ethical subject par excellence.  
    Kidane’s peacableness is nowhere more obvious than in the readiness with 
which he submits to arrest and in the scenes where he meets with the chief 
Jihadist (Salem Dendou) to learn how he will be judged for the death of 
Amadou. Here, of course, he is faced not just with the vulnerability of human 
interdependence, but with the political dominance of Jihadist rule and the 
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harshness of Sharia law. (Other instances of political – rather than ethical – 
persecution in Timbuktu also stem from Sharia law – the ban on music, 
football and any instance of extra-marital sex.) Kidane is told that if Amadou’s 
family agree to pardon him at his trial (in Butlerian terms, an 
acknowledgement by the Other of shared vulnerability), the judge may decide 
in his favour (in the event, no such pardon is forthcoming). He repeats at the 
trial what he has said at the initial meeting with the chief Jihadist about not 
fearing the death that awaits him, and speaks instead about his love for his 
family and particularly for Toya, the only child God has blessed him with. She 
is everything to him, Kidane explains, and what pains him about the 
judgement he is undergoing is not the destiny of an early death but first, that 
he cannot see her face again before he is tried, and second, that his death will 
leave Toya unprotected in the world. Kidane sits motionless during these 
exchanges with the chief Jihadist as a single tear rolls down his right cheek, 
the very image of vulnerability in a more everyday sense. Despite the 
unbending Sharia law being applied to his actions, his interview with the chief 
Jihadist is depicted by Sissako as a human exchange. Kidane dares to appeal 
to his judge as a man and a parent who worships the same God as he does, 
upon which he learns that the chief Jihadist has been blessed with two 
children including an eight year-old boy. The chief Jihadist even expresses 
sympathy for Kidane’s fate, but orders that this should not be recorded in the 
notes of their meeting. 
    In an interview with Positif about Timbuktu, Sissako makes a comment 
about fragility (fragilité) that seems to pick up directly on the concepts of 
precariousness and vulnerability around which Butler’s ethics is formulated. 
 21 
Fragility, he suggests, is not a problem or something to be eliminated, but a 
‘source de création’. This seems to be elaborated on in another interview 
conducted at the 2014 Cannes film festival with the film’s main performers 
(Ibrahim Ahmed, Toulou Kiki, Abdel Jafri) as well as with Sissako, where it is 
obvious that the latter’s working relationship with his actors is highly 
collaborative – he sets out what he wants from each scene, but trusts his 
performers to produce it in their own way, rather than imposing his own. (The 
word ‘improvisation’ is not used in this discussion, but something very like it is 
described.) Some of the most powerful scenes in Timbuktu – Kidane exposed 
before the chief Jihadist, Abdelkrim’s performances of inadequacy with his 
driver and when wooing Satima – have been arrived at not by means of 
precise planning and construction, but have been ‘found’, collaboratively, 
through an awareness of mutual dependency and its attendant vulnerability. 
In this way, elements of Sissako’s films and his film-making method can be 
seen to issue out of a common human experience of vulnerability to violence 
to which he is particularly sensitive, and on which he sometimes draws 
consciously.  
    In this discussion of how film studies has engaged with the so-called 
‘ethical turn’ in the critical humanities since the 1990s, I have focused on the 
ethically-inclined political theory written by Judith Butler in the 2000s and 
2010s, and considered how the precariousness and vulnerability suggested 
by Butler as the foundation of a new ontology of subjectivity can be seen in 
two of Abderrahmane Sissako’s films from the same period. A density of 
aesthetic engagement that is at the same time an evocation of ethical 
experience is evident in Bamako’s aesthetic of interruption, one that 
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corresponds closely to the fourth dimension of the cinema-ethics relationship 
set out by Robert Sinnerbrink in his Cinematic Ethics. The finely crafted and 
complex texture Sissako achieves in Bamako, also approachable in terms of 
its blending of documentary and fictional elements but already evident in the 
film’s visual and verbal composition at the levels of action, editing and 
framing, is ultimately just as important as the improbability of a trial of global 
institutions taking place in a semi-domestic setting in contemporary Mali. The 
texture of Timbuktu is also complex and densely woven, but in Sissako’s later 
film, his emphasis on universality gives way to more keenly felt dramatizations 
of vulnerability that also merit consideration in the terms of Judith Butler’s 
ethics, embedded as they are in a subtle narrative constructed by Sissako 
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